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Mark Weinstein’s, Logic, Truth and Inquiry is an ambitious and 
provocative case for a theory of truth and warrant strength that will 
undergird an “account of argument in the broad sense of current 
argumentation theory” (p. 12). I begin with a very schematic 
synopsis of Weinstein’s rich discussion through his six chapters. 
Weinstein himself notes that his arguments are “frequently 
presented in broad outline” (p. 1), so my quick sketch will be even 
broader. I conclude with some brief observations about both what 
the book leaves unresolved and the merits of Weinstein’s intriguing 
book. 
 
 
1.  Synopsis 
 
In the first chapter, Weinstein frames the challenge of providing an 
adequate account of truth for argumentation theory. According to 
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Weinstein, despite recognition of the importance of context (and 
audience), informal logicians and argumentation theorists still tend 
to adhere to a basic logic that is underpinned by a correspondence 
theory of truth. But, “ordinary argumentation most often deals with 
issues for which a corresponding reality is none too clear” (p. 7). 
One consequence, says Weinstein, has been a shift away from truth 
toward acceptability within the theory of argument evaluation. But 
Weinstein wants to resist this shift since “no mater how construed 
or qualified, acceptability still remains vulnerable to the question: 
It is (e.g., rationally) acceptable, but is it true …?” (p. 9). But if not 
correspondence or acceptability, “whence the epistemic adequacy 
of arguments?” (p. 15). Weinstein considers James Freeman’s 
commonsense foundationalism, which locates the epistemic 
adequacy in the generation of acceptable premises via reliable 
belief generating mechanisms, but rejects it on the grounds that at 
best this is only the beginning of the story, for the reliability of the 
mechanisms can only be judged against the backdrop of critical 
inquiry. Next, Weinstein considers Robert Pinto’s appeal to 
“critical practice,” which Weinstein, in at least broad outline, 
accepts. But Weinstein eschews Pinto’s (and most of informal 
logic’s) prevalent focus on “ordinary argumentation” and instead 
proposes scientific inquiry as “more appropriate as an 
epistemological paradigm of successful critical practice than the 
procedures of commonsense solutions to everyday problems” (p. 
35).  
 Weinstein turns from his discussion of the adequacy of 
premises in the first chapter to a discussion of the adequacy of 
inferences in Chapter 2. In particular, Weinstein is interested in 
grounding a theory of entailment adequate for argumentation 
theory as he conceives it. Hence, in the first section of the chapter, 
Weinstein runs through a quick exploration of deductive validity, 
Carnap’s meaning postulates, Harvey Siegel’s fallibilist 
foundationalism, Trudy Govier’s discussion of argument 
reconstruction, and Stephen Toulmin’s warrants. In the second 
section of the chapter, Weinstein proposes and defends modeling 
Toulmin’s warrants not in terms of a metamathematical model 
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based on arithmetic, but rather one based on scientific inquiry. The 
hope is to avoid Siegel’s worries about relativism while avoiding 
the narrow applicability of deductive validity as a standard. The 
upshot of Chapter 2 is that the adequacy of inferences will be based 
on the warrants backing them, so argumentation theory needs a 
theory of the adequacy of warrants. That is the general project of 
Chapter 3. 
 Weinstein begins Chapter 3 with a discussion of Putnam’s 
internal realist take on truth, in which truth is not external to our 
theorizing, but grows within it (p. 75). Unfortunately, like many in 
argumentation theory, Putnam resorts to an ideal epistemic 
community to try to avoid relativism. But “without some sense of 
what warrants the standards to which such an ideal community 
would appeal truth collapses into acceptability” (p. 76). Weinstein 
instead recommends trying to capture Putnam’s insights about truth 
via metamathematical models based on capturing scientific inquiry 
rather than arithmetic. Part II of Chapter 3 presents Weinstein’s 
Model of Emerging Truth (MET). While typical of the dense going 
of formalism, Weinstein helpfully intersperses the formalism with 
scholia, paragraphs that in his words “explain or amplify the 
formalism.” The general gist of the formalism is to define a 
sequence of models, ordered in time, based not on a logical 
consequence relation, but a weaker explanation-like relation. While 
truth in a model is standard, Weinstein claims the more relevant 
features of the overarching structure are the features of the 
sequences of models. Very roughly, the ordering of the models is 
meant to capture the breadth, depth, and consilience of the theories 
the models represent. The ordering will generate a “best” theory, T, 
with a “best” ontology, O*, from which a fairly standard Tarskian 
truth predicate can be defined: “s is true” for s in T and T in 
scientific structure TT, iff O*||-s (p. 100). But, “the truth condition 
for the various theories T, of TT, that is to say O*, cannot be 
ascertained independently of the history of TT, but grows out of the 
progressive nature of TT” (p. 101). 
 In Chapter 4, Weinstein uses the MET to ground a theory of 
warrant strength. In particular, taking the generalizations contained 
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in the ordered realizations of theories modeled in MET as warrants, 
He proposes to determine the strength of a warrant in terms of the 
embeddedness of the warrrant within the ordering of models. In 
this way he hopes to account for a more nuanaced view of 
contradiction and how we maintain generalizations even in the 
light of counter-instances. Briefly, counter-instances that are not 
themselves supported by warrants at least as deeply embedded as 
the generalizations they challenge are rationally resisted. In the 
latter setions of the chapter, Weinstein shows how this can be done 
by amalgamating his MET with a modified adaptive logic of 
Christian Straßer and Dunja Seselja. An elaboration of this 
amalgamation is done in Part V via Weinstein’s discussion of 
Staßer and Seselja’s example of the continental drift debate of the 
1920s (which in this context also serves as an example of the 
application of MET to a substantive debate).  
 Chapter 5 is devoted to connecting the MET to empirical 
instances in order to show that the theoretical framework is not 
empty. The primary example is the development of the peridoic 
table. Of course showing that the inquiry that leads to the periodic 
table matches the MET should be no surprise since it is that inquiry 
that motivated Weinstein’s development of the MET.  But in the 
latter half of the chapter, Weinstein presents a “metaphoric 
extension of the logical metaphor that is the MET,” (p. 158) to 
legal, ethical, and political argument “to indicate the possibility of 
applying the core concepts of the MET across the spectrum [of 
argument cultures]” (p. 179).  
 One of the apparent consequnces of Chapter 5, was that the 
adequate evaluation of arguments requires understanding the larger 
frameworks within which particular arguments are made. What 
then are the implications for critical thinking and informal logic? 
Chapter 6, while on the one hand a tracing out of some of the 
implications of Weinstein’s work for critical thinking, informal 
logic, and argumentation theory (and the teaching of critical 
thinking to undergraduates), is mostly devoted to discussions of the 
motivations and insights that led Weinstein towards the MET (as 
but one possible way to encapsulate those insights) (p. 200). 
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Hence, much of the chapter recapitulates much of Weinstein’s 
earlier work arguing for an “applied epistemology” focus for 
critical thinking and informal logic and could almost be read first 
as a foundation for the previous five chapters. 
 
 
2.  Observations 
 
Those familiar with Weinstein’s work will recognize many of the 
arguments and themes of his papers and presentations from the last 
three decades. Weinstein’s hope is that in this book “others see my 
work,…, as a unified whole” (p. 214). Given the usual dense and 
wide-ranging nature of Weinstein’s papers and talks, it is a benefit 
to see what Weinstein himself calls the “fragments” connected in a 
mostly unified package. Of course, given three decades of scope, 
there are tensions within the text. I give four interconnected 
examples. Firstly, there is an unresolved balancing act between the 
judgments of the experts in a field determining such things as the 
appropriateness of approximations within the model framework, 
and the resulting model complexes being normative constraints on 
the judgments of experts in the field. This is related to a second 
tension between the pragmatics and the formalism. Those who are 
leary of formalism’s role in argumentation theory are unlikely to be 
assuaged by Weinstein’s account, and those who treat formalism 
seriously are likely to be concerned by the appeal to intuitive 
judgments to ground the formalism—for example, resolving ties in 
competing warrant strength is a pragmatic decision (p 126). In 
general, one might worry about the degree to which our parochial 
decisions underpin the normativity of the models versus the alleged 
objectivity of the resulting model complexes acting as a constraint 
on what counts as a “good” judgment. 
 Thirdly, despite early attempts to eschew acceptability in 
favor of at least an emergent truth, later chapters seem to fall back 
on acceptability. For example, Weinstein writes: “to indicate a 
logical structure for acceptability that, at the limit, is as true as we 
can ever hope for” (p. 147). Indeed, we might wonder whether 
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what Weinstein calls scientific truth or TT-truth is also subject to 
the open question that Weinstein, in Chapter 1, poses as a problem 
for acceptability—yes s is satisfied by the complex of models that 
constitute the ontology of TT, but is it true? Finally, there is a 
tension between how the model is supposed to be applicable from 
science to politics (in that sense it is a general account of 
argumentation) and yet it also be the case that “restricted principles 
from within the disciplines, order and inform the understanding of 
substantial arguments more effectively than do many of the more 
abstract analyses common in informal logic” (p. 203).  
 Given the ambitious and broad-ranging project Weinstein 
undertakes, it is also unsurprising that there are unresolved 
questions about the consequences of his views. For example, what 
is the upshot for argument cogency? Is it that we really cannot 
determine argument cogency without a whole lot more background 
analysis than is usually available? On the one hand one may be 
skeptical of this result since we do seem to make local judgments 
of adequacy—in the face of dubious or even obviously false 
premises, or clearly insufficient reasons we are right to reject (or at 
least abstain from) certain propositions, views, theories, etc. But on 
the other hand, if Weinstein is correct, then there is a worry that we 
will not be able to adequately assess arguments without being 
experts in the domain of use and given the desire to prepare 
students (and ourselves) to be able to assess a wide variety of 
arguments from a plethora of domains, without being experts in all 
these domains. Also, Weinstein presents an idealized, well-behaved 
model of inquiry. Model chains are added to over time in a nice 
neat fashion. But one might wonder how chains or parts of chains 
are redacted in a scientific structure. Put another way, the ideal 
model may give us a way to see emerging “truth,” but how does it 
capture or represent what is rejected or taken to be false? In 
standard model-theoretic constructions of possible worlds for 
example, falsehood is just absence from the world. But in 
Weinstein’s proposal we are comparing complexes of models over 
time. Hence, it may just be that all (relevant) model chains are 
considered—it is just the ones that will be “rejected” as false will 
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be the ones that are not as deeply embedded and interconnected 
with what inquiry reveals as the most “virtuous” model complex. 
 Weinstein is not unaware of many of these tensions and 
unresolved questions, but these just point the way to future 
research. For example, he writes: “My use of intuitive, over-
simplified and idealized metamathematical constructs should be 
seen as an invitation to others to extend and correct the basic 
insight through mathematical constructions that more adequately 
describe the model relations in chains of models for particular 
aspects of signifincant inquiry” (p. 95). Given his own view, the 
inquiry required for the filling in of the details of the model or, say, 
the details of the relationship between the generality of Weinstein’s 
proposal and the reliance on discipline specific norms could easily 
engender significant shifts in the overall structure of the resulting 
theory. (Though if Weinstein is correct, even these shifts would 
still vindicate the underlying intution of his model of inquiry.) For 
example, how general the standards are (even if the model used to 
measure the standards in the various disciplines is roughly the 
same) may depend upon the outcome of the possibility of a TOE 
(theory of everything) in which the model networks will be 
connected to each other in ways that allow for univocal assessment 
of the strength of warrants, or whether the networks will only be 
connected in a way that allows for discipline specific evaluations of 
arguments and warrant strengths. Either outcome is consistent with 
Weinstein’s proposal. 
 One should not construe my raising of these tensions and 
questions within Weinstein’s work as refutations of its worth, but 
rather goads for continued refinement. 
 There are many intriguing, even if controversial, proposals 
and arguments that warrant argumentation theorists’ interest and 
deep consideration. For example, the radical, yet intriguing view 
that “truth is seen as a field property rather than a relation between 
a proposition and a state of affairs” (p. 2); or that argumentation 
theory need not eschew formal models and yet can still capture the 
dynamics of argument and inquiry rather than just some static 
absolute truth; or that a shift in focus away from commonsense 
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everyday argument to the more rigouros, but still less than 
absolutely certain, domain of scientific inquiry as the basis for a 
theory of argumentation is merited—after all, if we are interested 
in improving the reasoning of others why focus on how people in 
fact argue everyday rather than on the more demanding and self-
corrective practice of scientific inquiry? But perhaps the most 
promising proposal is the view of Chapters 3 and 4 that warrant 
strength can be measured in the MET. If true, then a means of 
comparing the respective weight of competing arguments is 
possible and may help resolve the dialectical tier issue of how 
much defending against objections an arguer is obligated to 
perform. 
 My brief observations barely scratch the surface of the deep, 
broad-ranging, and challenging discussions in Weinstein’s book. 
An unabshed foray into the foundations of argumentation theory 
(and inquiry in general), along with unreserved metamathematical 
modelling makes Logic, Truth and Inquiry not for the faint of 
heart. But argument and inquiry are extremely complex 
phenomena, so we should expect attempts to elucidate them to be 
equally complex. The diligent reader, however, will be rewarded 
by the rich and fruitful position Weinstein lays out—a position that 
needs consideration by a broad spectrum of argumentation 
theorists. 
